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INTRODUCTION 
Ariella1 came to this country at a young age and experienced domestic 
violence throughout her life—“rape resulting in her [young] motherhood, 
forced marriage to her rapist, sexual abuse by [her] family members, 
[severe] beatings, and burnings.”2  After being left for dead, she escaped her 
abusive husband, only to be placed in foster care because she was a minor 
with no other family in the country.3 
Once in the foster care system, Ariella did not receive adequate physical 
or mental health treatment.4  She was denied appropriate foster placement 
and placed in a home without a separate bed for her child.5  Ariella’s foster 
mother would withhold welfare funding designated for Ariella and her son, 
and then demand that Ariella pay the foster mother for babysitting the child 
while Ariella worked.6  Ariella found work at a bar to support herself and her 
son since the foster care agency did not provide monetary support but 
expected her to pay for the baby’s basic necessities like food and diapers.7  
Working in a bar was both illegal and inappropriate for a minor; it required 
 
 * J.D./M.P.P. Candidate (2014), University of Pennsylvania Law School and Harvard Ken-
nedy School of Government.  My deepest gratitude to Professor Serena Mayeri and Mar-
cia Glickman for the time spent editing, discussing, and advising me during the course of 
this project and for continually cultivating my passion for child welfare.  Thank you to 
Grant Garlinghouse for his endless love, support, and encouragement that made this 
comment possible.  This article is dedicated to my family who opened their home to so 
many foster children over the years and inspired me to pursue the field of child advocacy. 
 1 “Ariella” is a pseudonym, and this story is taken from a case study in Rebecca Bonagura, 
Comment, Redefining the Baseline:  Reasonable Efforts, Family Preservation, and Parenting Foster 
Children in New York, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 175, 183 & n.34 (2008). 
 2 Id. at 184. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id.  
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Ariella to leave her foster home in the middle of the night and left her 
exhausted all day.8 
As evidence of Ariella’s need for therapy, services, and a supportive 
home environment, Ariella made a “suicide attempt”—small cuts on her 
wrists that required a cold compress and band aids.9  The state used this 
opportunity to remove her son, and the foster care agency filed a neglect 
petition against her.10  In proving she was an unfit mother, the agency used 
the foster mother’s complaints about Ariella’s work place, her work attire, 
and her late hours against her.11  The job Ariella was forced to have to 
provide for her son was used by the agency to prove her inability to parent.  
As a result of being a young mother in foster care and largely due to the 
inadequacies of the foster care system, Ariella was not provided court-
ordered services like child care and parenting classes or the resources to 
take care of herself or her son, resulting in her child’s removal.12 
Teenage parents, as both minors and parents, are strangely situated 
when it comes to the fundamental right to family integrity.  Minors have full 
parental autonomy over their children but are constrained as minors from 
signing leases, applying for public benefits, and even opening checking 
accounts.  Interfering with the rights of young mothers to make parenting 
decisions is prohibited, but restrictions associated with foster care 
placements often infringe on this right and impair parenting wards’ 
freedom to control the care of their children. 
Parenting wards13 face infringements on their right to family integrity 
that raise two types of constitutional issues:  due process and equal 
protection claims.  The due process problems take on multiple forms.  Since 
family integrity is a fundamental right, the state has to have a compelling 
interest—such as protection of the child—to interfere with family life.14  
When a foster care placement restricts the childrearing decisions of young 
mothers in foster care, it is an unjust infringement on their right to family 
integrity.  Also, when the state meddles in the young mother’s life and 
separates the parent and child without threats to the safety or well-being of 
the child, the mother’s due process rights are violated. 
Equal protection claims arise because parenting wards meet differential 
treatment as a group from all other mothers when it comes to the threshold 
for removal of their children and the standards used in court proceedings.  
 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 185. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 “Parenting wards” is the term commonly used to refer to minor parents in foster care. 
 14 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 792 (3d ed. 2006). 
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Due to the disadvantage of their age and the nature of foster care 
placements, parenting wards have a greater risk of facing allegations of 
abuse and neglect against their children.15  Dependency proceedings often 
hold young mothers accountable for harm to their babies that is not their 
fault and rebellious behaviors that do not create any risk of harm to their 
children,16 while similar behaviors are not held against other mothers. 
Part I of this Comment provides background information on pregnant 
and parenting teens.  Part II evaluates the rights of minor parents to family 
integrity and the intergenerational implications of their rights.  That Part 
explains that although minor parents are given parental rights in name, 
being a parent does not cure their minority.  Due to their age, young 
parents have limited access to resources they need to parent their children, 
such as housing, appropriate medical care, employment, and welfare 
benefits.17  However, minors’ full access to parental autonomy limits the 
adult parents’18 authority to control their minor parenting child.  The 
inability to interfere with the minor’s parenting decisions ultimately restricts 
the adult parents’ rights to family integrity and removes any obligation on 
them to provide additional help to the young mother. 
Part III of this Comment lays out the constitutional right to family 
integrity and the standards the state is required to meet for interfering with 
that right.  The Part begins by outlining the historical application of the 
fundamental right to family integrity given to adult parents.  Then, this 
Comment examines the traditional framework and justification for 
curtailing the rights of adolescents.  Minors’ right to bodily integrity in the 
abortion context is used as an example to demonstrate the standard 
interplay between the rights of parents and the rights of minors.  Extending 
the traditional analysis, this Comment argues that adolescents’ right to 
family integrity is anomalous and could be curtailed according to the 
justifications used in the abortion context.  The Part concludes with an 
explanation of the “conditional curtailment” test that can be used as a tool 
to protect minors’ interests if their rights are curtailed, by imposing 
obligations on the adult parents to act in the minor’s best interest, provide 
support and resources, and play a critical role in her development. 
Part IV explains the structure of the foster care system and dependency 
court proceedings, specifically for young mothers.  This Part provides 
 
 15 AMY DWORSKY & JAN DECOURSEY, PREGNANT AND PARENTING FOSTER YOUTH:  THEIR 
NEEDS, THEIR EXPERIENCES 34 (2009). 
 16 Rebecca Horwitz et al., Protection v. Presentment:  When Youths in Foster Care Become 
Respondents in Child Welfare Proceedings, 2012 J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 421, 426. 
 17 These are de jure restrictions that vary from state to state. 
 18 Throughout the Comment, the parents of young mothers will be referred to as “natural 
parents,” “adult parents,” and “natural adult parents.” 
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background information on the different types of child welfare court 
proceedings and the different types of foster care placements for young 
mothers.  This Part also outlines the changes that occur after a ward has a 
baby and what protections are in place for the young mother and her child. 
Part V explores the duties of foster care agencies to young mothers in 
their care.  Because the state stands in the place of the natural adult parent 
due to no fault of the young mother, foster agencies should not be allowed 
to infringe on the minor’s parenting decisions.  However, child welfare 
agencies have two specific obligations to children in their care:  to prepare 
minors for life after foster care and to protect children in care from 
foreseeable harm. 
Part VI explores the due process and equal protection violations that 
face young mothers in foster care.  Due process problems first arise when 
foster care placements restrict the parenting decisions of young mothers.  
The second type of due process claims arise from the unwarranted 
separation of parenting wards from their babies.  This Comment demon-
strates that parenting wards may first face separation from their babies after 
birth due to placement shortages.  Then, they encounter a high risk of 
removal of their children caused by problematic placements.  In addition, 
the nature of the placements dispose parenting wards to greater scrutiny, 
penalties for typical teenage behaviors that do not endanger their children, 
and coercion by social workers to place their children in care. 
The Part then explores the possible equal protection problems that 
arise.  This Comment argues that the nature of foster care placements 
means that the actions of parenting wards have different ramifications than 
the same actions taken by other mothers, so the threshold for government 
interference is lower for young mothers in care.  Once parenting wards are 
subject to dependency and termination proceedings, equal protection 
problems arise because they face adult standards without access to adult 
rights.  As a result, they are held to standards of “fitness” that are almost 
impossible to meet, effectually establishing a higher standard in court 
proceedings for teen mothers than for adult parents. 
In Part VII, this Comment advocates for a restructuring of adolescents’ 
parental rights by proposing a trade-off between young mothers and their 
caregivers supported by the “conditional curtailment” test:  adult parents 
and child welfare agencies can infringe on immature young mothers’ 
parenting decisions, but then there is an obligation to provide additional 
resources and support to the young mothers.  If the minor mother is mature 
enough that her rights should not be curtailed, she should be granted adult 
access to all other rights.  Even if the minor mother meets the maturity 
prong, she should be able to waive the full protection of her rights in 
exchange for the provision of enhanced services.  In Part VII, this Comment 
also examines possible legislative remedies and effective court rules that can 
alleviate some of the problems. 
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The Conclusion reiterates that the baby’s interests are furthered by 
improving the young mother’s interests.  The young mother’s interests are 
improved through restructuring the framework of minors’ parental rights 
and eliminating the constitutional violations that young mothers in foster 
care face. 
I.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Teenage pregnancy has become a common part of our culture.  The 
prevalence of teenage girls19 becoming pregnant and carrying their babies to 
term has even led to widespread depiction in the media.  From movies like 
Juno to television shows like Sixteen and Pregnant and news stories about 
pregnancy compacts, pregnant teens are portrayed in the media as a fixture 
of current society.  Teenage mothers are no longer sent away to have their 
babies, place them for adoption, and then reintegrate into daily life.20  
Instead, high schools have day cares,21 and maternity clothes come in teen 
fashions.  The majority of teenagers are sexually active before they reach age 
19,22 which results in “almost 1 million teenage women . . . becom[ing] 
pregnant per year,”23 about half of whom give birth.24  Most young women 
who give birth elect to keep their children.25  Teen pregnancy is here to stay, 
 
 19 Though minor fathers are undoubtedly a part of teenage pregnancy and parenting, teen 
couples “are rarely married and the father’s involvement is generally minimal,” so 
discussions about minor parenting become discussions about “minor mothering.”  Emily 
Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 785, 788 (2000) (internal footnotes 
omitted).  The concepts and legal analyses presented will usually apply to fathers, but 
where the analyses differ, the focus will be on the young mother.  See Eve Stotland & 
Cynthia Godsoe, The Legal Status of Pregnant and Parenting Youth in Foster Care, 17 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 8 n.20 (2006), for a discussion on how the rights of biological 
mothers and biological fathers differ in the eyes of the law. 
 20 This was never the widespread reality for young mothers of color.  See generally RICKIE 
SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS:  HOW THE POLITICS OF CHOICE SHAPES ADOPTION, 
ABORTION, AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES (2001). 
 21 See Nancy Zuckerbrod, Schools offering day care centers, USA TODAY (Aug. 25, 2007, 12:13 
PM), available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-08-25-2005188448_
x.htm, for just one account of how high schools around the country are starting daycares 
on school grounds. 
 22 ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS IN BRIEF:  FACTS ON AMERICAN TEENS’ SEXUAL AND 
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH (2013), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-
ATSRH.html (“By their 19th birthday, seven in 10 female and male teens have had inter-
course.”).  
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Anjani Chandra et. al., Adoption, Adoption Seeking, and Relinquishment for Adoption in the 
United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH 
STATISTICS, 306 ADVANCE DATA FROM VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS, at  9 (1999), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad306.pdf. 
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so the question becomes—how do these young mothers fit into our 
established legal and constitutional framework? 
The rate of pregnant and parenting teens in foster care is almost twice 
the rate of teens not in care.26  “Little data is available on the number and 
demographics of pregnant and parenting wards,”27 so anecdotal evidence is 
necessary to identify and address their needs.  The federal government 
collects and publishes data on children in the foster care system, but it does 
not include data on this “crucial subclass.”28  “[T]he vast majority of girls and 
young women who enter foster care pregnant or become pregnant, while in 
foster care, are survivors of child sexual, physical and emotional abuse or 
persistent neglect.”29  When abuse and neglect proceedings are initiated 
against these young parents in the foster care system, it means that they are 
defending themselves against the same type of charges that resulted in their 
own placement.30  Due to their childhood experiences of abuse and neglect, 
many parenting wards do not have the knowledge or resources to break the 
cycle of abuse, so they need help learning effective parenting practices.31  
This cycle of abuse and neglect results in a higher likelihood for parents 
who have been in foster care to have their child removed than minor 
parents without a history of state involvement.32 
II.  RIGHTS OF MINOR PARENTS AND INTERGENERATIONAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
Troxel v. Granville and its progeny have been interpreted to give minors 
the full rights to family integrity afforded to adult parents, not inhibited by 
their own adult parents’ interest in family autonomy.33  However, a minor 
parent’s status as a parent does not grant her access to other rights limited 
by her age just because she has a child.  This results in a gap in rights where 
minor parents are allowed to make important legal decisions on behalf of 
their children without the ability to make the same types of decisions for 
themselves.  There is little guidance on how to navigate this legal 
 
 26 MARK E. COURTNEY & AMY DWORSKY, CHAPLIN HALL CTR. FOR CHILDREN, MIDWEST 
EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH:  OUTCOMES AT AGE 
19, at 11 (2005), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/
ChapinHallDocument_3.pdf. 
 27 Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 5. 
 28 Id. 
 29 NAT’L CRITTENTON FOUND., PROCEEDINGS:  YOUNG MOTHERS IN FOSTER CARE CONVENING 
1 (2011) [hereinafter CRITTENTON FOUND.]. 
 30 Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 3. 
 31 CRITTENTON FOUND., supra note 29, at 1. 
 32 DWORSKY & DECOURSEY, supra note 15, at 26. 
 33 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000) (affirming strength of parent’s right to family 
integrity regardless of individual situation). 
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conundrum.  Because no state has enacted laws to limit the rights of minor 
parents, the Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue.34 
In this Part, this Comment will discuss the full scope of rights afforded to 
minor parents, the impact of minor parents’ rights to family integrity on 
their adult parents, and considerations for the baby.35 
A. The Scope of Minor Parents’ Rights 
There is a double standard and a duality of roles where minor parents 
are adults for the purposes of pregnancy and parenting but children for all 
other purposes.  Minor parents have the same rights to control the care and 
custody of their children as adult parents.36  This means that young parents 
have full legal custody of their children37 and the ability to make decisions 
on their behalf in every arena of life:  to consent to medical care, to apply 
for benefits, to make choices about education, and to make all other 
decisions that fall under the umbrella of family integrity.  However, a minor 
parent still faces legal incapacity due to her age; pregnancy and parenting 
do not cure a minor’s incapacity.38  Becoming a parent does not emancipate 
minors, and even if it did, emancipation relinquishes an adult parent’s 
duties to her child, but does not afford a minor the full rights of majority.39  
After giving birth, a minor parent still does not have the ability to make basic 
decisions that affect her quality of life and future success, such as entering 
into legally binding contracts (like a lease), consenting to medical 
procedures, and enrolling in school.40  This strange juxtaposition of rights 
and limitations results in situations that seem paradoxical.  For instance, 
without a law providing otherwise (medical emancipation), a minor parent 
can consent to an appendectomy for her child, but not for herself.41  The 
young mother would need her parent’s permission for her own 
appendectomy.  Some states allow a minor parent to apply for public 
assistance, like cash benefits or Medicaid; the state may protect her right to 
privacy in the application but then insist on sending the check to her 
 
 34 Buss, supra note 19, at, 787 n.6. 
 35 For ease and clarity of discussion, this Comment will refer to the minor parent’s child as 
“the baby.” 
 36 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (affirming the right to control care as a 
fundamental right). 
 37 See Buss, supra note 19, at 787 (“[N]o state has enacted laws to effect any limitations on 
parental rights when exercised by minors.”).  
 38 See Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 14–15 (noting that marriage cures incapacity, but 
a minor can only get married with parental or judicial approval, leaving “the key to the 
minor’s emancipation . . . in the hands of adult authorities”). 
 39 Id. at 2. 
 40 Id. at 2–3. 
 41 Id. at 3. 
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parents.42  She is considered responsible enough to seek assistance but not 
to spend the money wisely.43 
The minor is allowed to make the decision to have and keep her child 
without interference from the state or any consideration of her parents’ 
interest in her decision.  Nowhere is a pregnant teenager required to consult 
with her parents or obtain parental consent before having or keeping her 
baby.44  Nowhere are minors’ legal rights regarding the upbringing of their 
children limited, “even if they give birth at the age of eleven.”45  In many 
states, minors are not required to obtain parental consent before they 
terminate their own parental rights or give their baby up for adoption.46  
Minors are allowed to make these important decisions with the same 
impaired judgment, immaturity, and lack of foresight that prohibits them 
from unilaterally obtaining an abortion, consenting to medical procedures, 
or getting a tattoo. 
Paradoxically, the freedom to be a parent also means that young 
mothers are expected to fulfill adult parental responsibilities without the 
benefits and freedoms of being an adult.47  Young mothers are expected to 
fully meet the needs of their children and their parental obligations in the 
same manner as adult parents but with fewer available resources.  Housing, 
employment, access to medical care, and financial benefits are all resources 
that are necessary to raise a child.48  As minors, they do not have the ability 
to obtain independent housing, they cannot consent to their own medical 
care, they are not eligible for many vocational programs—or many jobs for 
that matter—and their receipt of benefits is contingent upon living with an 
adult.49  Young mothers who are prevented from obtaining resources 
necessary to maintain the welfare of their children are more likely to qualify 
as “unfit” parents.  Even if the young mother is a “good” parent and tries 
 
 42 Id. at 52. 
 43 See Marie A. Failinger, Ophelia with Child:  A Restorative Approach to Legal Decision-Making by 
Teen Mothers, 28 LAW & INEQ. 255, 256–57 (2010) (discussing how this contrasting 
structure of rights is manifested in Minnesota). 
 44 Buss, supra note 19, at 792. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See id. at 807 (discussing the important state interest in having minors seek parental 
consent prior to abortion); see also Failinger, supra note 43, at 258–59 (explaining how 
minors’ rights in Minnesota are different from those in other states and illuminating 
further the interplay of rights in Minnesota:  a young mother may keep her child over the 
opposition of her parents but cannot have an abortion without parental notification or 
court order, cannot terminate her own parental rights without her parents’ approval, and 
cannot give her child up for adoption without parental consent). 
 47 Bonagura, supra note 1, at 177. 
 48 These resources are considered “necessary resources” throughout the Comment. 
 49 See also Buss, supra note 19, at 805 (explaining the Supreme Court’s reasoning for 
disallowing these rights). 
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hard to provide for her child, she may not be able to meet the needs of her 
baby due to the limitations of her age. 
B. The Impact of These Rights on Adult Parents 
Adult parents have no voice in a minor’s decision to have and keep her 
baby.50  Once she decides to keep the baby, the adult parents have no say in 
how she parents the child and no direct authority over their child’s child.51  
Nowhere are they given any special standing or shared authority over their 
grandchild.52  Adult parents have no right to the custody and control of their 
adolescent child in these decisions, but they are still responsible to the 
minor parent in every other way.  Affording minor parents the full scope of 
parental rights interferes with their own parents’ ability to fulfill parental 
responsibilities.53 
Parents have the right to control the upbringing of their children, and 
this right includes an obligation to serve an important function to guide 
children in decisions that may greatly impact their lives.54  In the context of 
teenage pregnancy and parenting, the state has removed the parental 
obligation to guide the decisions of children.  By both restricting the adult 
parent’s interference with the minor parent’s decisions and affording the 
minor parent full access to the protections of family integrity, adult parents 
are both absolved of certain responsibilities and limited in their own 
realization of family integrity.  In the other constructions of parent-child 
rights, it is the adult parent’s rights that curtail and limit the full exercise of 
the child’s rights; here, there is an opposite effect.  The right of the teenage 
parent to mother her child becomes more important than her parents’ 
rights to control her upbringing, curtailing her parents’ rights to family 
integrity. 
C. Considerations for the Minor’s Child 
The baby has the right to the protections of general welfare and well-
being that all children should be entitled to.  While it may be instinctual to 
assume babies would be better off with a non-parent adult than with a minor 
 
 50 Id. at 792. 
 51 Id. at 808. 
 52 Id. at 792. 
 53 Id. at 806–07. See also Failinger, supra note 43, at 276–77, 282–83 (discussing different 
ways rights of teen mothers impact their parents’ rights). 
 54 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (discussing parental obligations in the 
context of education). See also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637–38 (1979) (discussing 
parental duty to guide child development). 
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parent,55 this is not necessarily the case.  Research shows that outcomes for 
children are better if they remain in their home with their biological 
parents.56  Removal is traumatic for children, regardless of the situation, and 
can have long-term negative effects.57  Even accounting for the current harm 
or limitations the child faces in the home, removal often results in a worse 
outcome and always takes a negative emotional toll on the child.58 
There may be a real psychological value to the baby remaining in the 
home and growing up with a sense that she belongs.59  In fact, “[t]he young 
child has at least as strong an interest as the minor parent in the proprietary 
conception of parental rights”60 since the baby may benefit more from 
remaining with her biological mother than the young mother benefits from 
raising a child at such a young age. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS 
Almost one hundred years ago, Meyer v. Nebraska determined that parents 
have a fundamental right to control the care and custody of their children.61  
This has been widely interpreted to mean that parents have great leeway to 
guide the upbringing of their children and to make parenting decisions that 
impact their children’s life trajectory.  While this freedom is not absolute 
since the state can interfere with this right to protect the welfare of the 
child,62 the right to family integrity has become one of the most recognized 
and highly protected fundamental rights. 
In this Part, the Comment will outline the Fourteenth Amendment right 
to family integrity and explain different ways to analyze adolescent rights.  
The complexity of adolescent rights will be examined under the traditional 
 
 55 See Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 61 (“[I]t is possible that a narrow focus on 
children’s rights has led advocates to overlook the plight of parenting wards.”). 
 56 There is a huge school of thought behind this research that promotes preserving the 
family over removing the child due to the long-term traumatic effects of removal.  Florida 
has recently reformed its foster care system to ameliorate the traumatic effects of removal.  
See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD:  THE LEAST 
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE (1996), for the leading arguments in this area. 
 57 Id. at 19–20 (stressing the importance of continuity of relationships and the problems 
associated with discontinuities.  A child’s removal from her biological parents to a foster 
home is a type of “discontinuous” relationship that has negative implications.).  
 58 Id. at 11–12 (This is true particularly in the context where the child is removed from the 
“psychological parent” with whom they share an emotional bond.).  
 59 Buss, supra note 19, at 825. 
 60 Id. at 826. 
 61 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–01 (1923) (holding that parents have a 
fundamental right to direct upbringing of their children by controlling their education). 
 62 See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (deciding that the state 
could interfere with a parent’s control of their child when they force a child into labor). 
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analysis, in the abortion context, with regards to family integrity, and 
utilizing the “conditional curtailment” test. 
A. Protection of Family Integrity and Parental Rights 
A parent’s right to raise her children in the manner she sees fit has been 
protected as a fundamental right for almost a century.63  It has become one 
of the strongest rights implied from the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and interference with the right to family integrity 
requires intermediate scrutiny analysis where the government must show a 
compelling interest in protecting the welfare of children.64  If the 
government has a compelling interest to infringe on a parent’s right, the 
means of infringement must be necessary to achieve the compelling goal.65 
The freedom to regulate the upbringing of one’s children allows parents 
to make decisions affecting almost every area of their children’s lives with 
great latitude and few restrictions.66  Thus, “[t]he primary role of the parents 
in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an 
enduring American tradition.”67  The most recent delineation of these rights 
came in Troxel v. Granville.  In Troxel, the grandparents of the Troxel 
children wished to have increased visitation with their grandchildren, but 
Tommie Granville, the children’s biological mother, would not allow the 
liberal visitation they desired.68  The Washington Superior Court granted the 
Troxels visitation with the children over Granville’s express objection.69  The 
Supreme Court held that decisions such as who the children could visit with 
and when fell within the protected category of family integrity and that the 
judgment was an unconstitutional infringement on Tommie Granville’s 
 
 63 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402 (contrasting the Spartan child-rearing system of removing boys 
from their parents at age seven with the American system and noting that “[a]lthough 
such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius, their ideas 
touching the relation between individual and State were wholly different from those 
upon which our institutions rest.”). 
 64 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) (shaping the standard for governmental 
interference with theright to family integrity). 
 65 The typical four-prong analysis asks (1) Is there a fundamental right? (2) Is the 
constitutional right infringed? (3) Is there sufficient justification for the government’s 
infringement of the right? (4) Is the means sufficiently related to the purpose?  
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 794–97. 
 66 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (allowing parents to educate their 
children outside of state-approved schools); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–
35 (1925) (holding that parents may choose to enroll their children in nonpublic 
education); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400–02 (allowing parents to enroll their children in foreign 
language instruction). 
 67 Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 8 n.25 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232). 
 68 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61. 
 69 Id. at 62. 
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fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of her two daughters.70  In addition, the plurality ruled that the 
biological mother’s decision should receive deference in accordance with 
the assumption that parents act in the best interests of their children.71  
Courts generally assume that parents make decisions with their children’s 
welfare in mind and that parents are better situated than other individuals 
to make decisions that will positively impact their children’s growth and 
development.72 
The Troxel Court found that the intermediate scrutiny test should be 
applied to balance a parent’s right to raise her child with the state’s role as 
parens patriae in protecting the welfare of children without requiring a 
narrow tailoring of the means like strict scrutiny.73  The plurality in Troxel 
held that 
so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), 
there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the 
private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to 
make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s 
children.74 
Though the Troxel Court was split in its decision, every Justice affirmed the 
“long-standing jurisprudence” that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment precludes undue interference in raising, nurturing, 
and educating children.75 
Though the Court has been liberal in its provision of autonomy to 
parents, the right of family integrity is not absolute or without review.  The 
state may interfere with and abrogate that right where necessary to protect 
children from harm.76  If a parent’s decisions or inaction pose a serious 
threat to the welfare of the child, a higher degree of governmental intrusion 
is warranted.77 
Because a “natural parent’s desire for and right to the companionship, 
care, custody, and management of his or her children is an interest far more 
 
 70 Id. at 72. 
 71 Id. at 68. 
 72 Buss, supra note 19, at 805 (interpreting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)). 
 73 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67–73.  Note that Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, 
advocated for a strict scrutiny analysis of laws infringing on the fundamental rights of 
parents.  Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Though the Supreme Court has ruled that 
the constitutional standard for infringement on family integrity is intermediate scrutiny, 
that is the minimal standard allowed, and many states require heightened scrutiny for 
infringement.  Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 20. 
 74 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69. 
 75 Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 9 (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 95 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting)). 
 76 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (holding that the state can encroach 
on First Amendment religious liberties of children further than those of adults). 
 77 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 767 (1982). 
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precious than any property right,”78 parents have a right to a hearing on 
parental fitness and cannot be denied custody based solely on a 
presumption or stereotype.79  The state is allowed to completely sever the 
highly protected right of family integrity only if it finds the custodial parent 
unfit by a clear and convincing standard of evidence.80  The state has a high 
bar to meet to justify intrusion into the sacred realm of family life.  Unless a 
parent’s actions are egregious or pose considerable harm to the child, the 
state affords her autonomy and exclusive control over decisions dictating the 
child’s upbringing. 
B. Adolescents’ Rights 
To better understand minors’ rights as parents and how these rights 
compare to other adolescent rights, Section B will explore the traditional 
analysis of adolescent rights, minors’ rights to abortion, the uniqueness of 
minors’ rights to family integrity, and the “conditional curtailment” test that 
arises in this context. 
1. Traditional Analysis 
It is widely known and easily recognized that minors are not afforded the 
same rights as adults.  Age limitations impact even some of the most routine 
activities:  driving a car, getting into “R”-rated movies, purchasing alcohol, 
and voting.  The complete realization of rights does not come until an 
individual achieves the age of majority.  Young people do have rights of their 
own, including due process rights, but even these are limited.81  The 
curtailment of these rights is usually justified by children’s minority.82  Age-
based distinctions are only justified if they serve important state interests and 
the state interest is linked to children’s special development status.83  The 
 
 78 Id. at 758–59 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972) (finding that a biological father could not 
be presumed an unfit parent simply because he was a man). 
 80 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769–70. 
 81 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967) (granting minors the right to due process and the 
right to an attorney in criminal proceedings); Sarah Katz, When the Child Is a Parent:  
Effective Advocacy for Teen Parents in the Child Welfare System, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 535, 542 
(2006) (elaborating further to explain that “[r]ather than carving out affirmative rights 
for children, the United States Supreme Court has carved out a series of protections”). 
 82 Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (justifying restrictions on 
contraceptive access to minors and reaffirming that minors are not entitled to the same 
rights as adults). 
 83 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74–75 (1976) (holding that 
the “state has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of 
adults” where the state has a “significant state interest” that is “not present in the case of 
an adult”). 
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Court has continually held that the constitutional rights of minors can be 
curtailed due to three governmental interests:  to protect minors from 
vulnerability, to help minors make critical and mature decisions, and to 
defer to the parents’ important role in guiding the minors’ upbringing.84 
The Court often cites minors’ impaired decision-making capacity when 
curtailing their rights,85 but the Court cannot limit minors’ rights solely 
because it has concerns about their capacity to make decisions.  The long-
term implications of a minor’s decisions also come into consideration; 
restrictions on rights are accepted when a minor’s decision could have a 
severe, long-term impact on her or someone else.  Because the Court is 
concerned with the ability of minors to make informed, mature, and 
reasoned decisions, the state acts in a paternalistic capacity by limiting 
minors’ freedom of choice when “bad” decisions could have negative 
ramifications long into the future.  Emily Buss clarifies the state’s interest in 
preventing minors’ exercise of these rights: 
[T]he state has a particularly strong interest in preventing minors from 
exercising decision making authority over the very issues for which adults 
are afforded the greatest constitutional protection.  We protect the right 
of an adult to make autonomous decisions about the matters that will 
most affect the course of his life, but it is precisely those decisions that we 
fear entrusting to children.86 
In addition, parents’ fundamental right to control the custody and care 
of their children comes with an obligation to provide for and protect the 
rights of their children.  Without the strong interest in development and the 
guiding role of parents, the justification for restricting minors’ rights and 
the framework of restrictions would fall apart.  Without an obligation on 
parents to fill the gaps between restricted adolescent rights and the full 
realization of rights, curtailments would end up being deprivations instead 
of simply restrictions. 
It is these three major concerns—minors’ vulnerability to pressure, 
inability to make critical decisions, and need for guidance in the decision-
making process—that lead courts to decide that minors may only make 
decisions that have short-term implications. 
 
 84 This three-pronged justification was first articulated in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 
(1979). 
 85 See Buss, supra note 19, at 799–805 (discussing differences in cognitive development 
between adolescents and adults and how the Court has used the assumption of impaired 
decision making to justify the curtailment of rights based on age). 
 86 Id. at 802. 
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2. Minors’ Rights in the Abortion Context 
Abortion is one of many contexts where minors’ rights are curtailed.  
While the Court has held that all females have a right to abortion and bodily 
integrity regardless of age,87 a minor’s full realization of that right cannot be 
obtained solely through her independent decision.  Adolescent girls’ rights 
are restricted due to their minority status because (1) the decision has a 
long-term impact, (2) the adult parents’ right to family integrity entitles 
them to guide the upbringing of their daughters and thus the decision 
whether or not to have an abortion, and (3) the parents are expected and 
obligated to act in their daughters’ best interest due to the limitation of 
rights.88  Since adolescent rights to abortion fit neatly into the standard 
framework of adolescent rights and the traditional application of the right to 
family integrity, it is a valuable springboard for evaluating and comparing 
minors’ parental rights. 
The right of minors to obtain abortions is an area where a fundamental 
liberty interest of a minor is mitigated by a fundamental liberty interest of 
her parent. The competing right of the parent to family integrity and the 
state’s interest in making sure parents are notified of the abortion weigh 
against her right.89  In the abortion context, the compelling interest of the 
state is closely connected to parental rights to family integrity.  Since the 
parents have a constitutional right to raise their children as they see fit, the 
state has an interest in making sure parents are aware of their daughter’s 
decision to have an abortion.90 
The Court is also concerned about the impaired decision-making ability 
of the young mother and the serious, long-term implications of her 
decision.91  The Court compromises minors’ rights to bodily integrity due to 
the weight of the decision and the need for parental involvement in this type 
of decision.  The substantial justification results in curtailment of the young 
girl’s rights.  Along with the curtailment comes an obligation on the parents 
to provide for the child (inherent in the right to family integrity).92 
This is a strong example of the traditional construction of adolescents’ 
rights.  The curtailment is based on the impaired decision-making capacity 
of the minor, the respect for an adult parent’s interest in family integrity, 
and the prominent role parents are expected to play in their children’s life-
 
 87 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (providing for the fundamental right to bodily integrity 
for women). 
 88 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634–37 (1979). 
 89 Id. at 637. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 635–36. 
 92 Id. at 634–37. 
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shaping decisions.  The parent’s right to raise her children does not trump 
the minor’s fundamental right, but only curtails it.93 
3. Family Integrity in the Adolescent Rights Framework 
Under the three justifications typically used to curtail adolescents’ rights, 
infringement on the right to family integrity is justified.  Under the first 
justification, a minor’s decision to have a child of her own falls into the 
category of far-ranging consequences that the Court typically does not leave 
to minors.94  Arguably even more than the decision not to have a child 
would impact the rest of her life, the decision to have a child has long-
reaching implications for both a young mother and her baby.  Under the 
second thread of reasoning, the minor’s adult parents have an interest in 
controlling the upbringing of their child, including whether or not the child 
becomes a parent.  Indeed, the adult parents are allowed to exercise some 
control over the minor’s decision to have (or not to have) a child.  Under 
the final justification for curtailment, the role of the adult parents once their 
child has a baby is at least as important as before the birth, and their role is 
no less important than during their daughter’s decision whether to have an 
abortion.  Indeed, the adult parents’ role and obligation in guiding the 
child’s transition to adulthood and parenthood seem as important, if not 
more important, than their role in the abortion decision.  Due to these 
justifications, under the traditional application of adolescent rights, a 
minor’s right to family integrity would be curtailed, but her parents would 
be expected to fill any gaps that might result. 
4. “Conditional Curtailment” Test 
The traditional analysis courts engage in to justify restricting adolescent 
rights while protecting minors through obligations on the parents can be 
distilled into a “conditional curtailment” test:  (1) if minors are not mature 
enough to make decisions that will impact the rest of their lives, (2) then 
parents have an obligation to act in the best interest of their children and 
play a critical role in filling any gaps the curtailment might leave.  The 
 
 93 Since teen girls have the right to abortion, there must be a judicial bypass procedure to 
circumvent parental consent or notification if necessary.  See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for 
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 649–50. See also H.L. v. 
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (clarifying that as long as parents do not have veto power 
over the abortion decision, mandatory parental notification for minors is acceptable). 
 94 Buss opines that this differing allocation of rights and the ability to decide to bear a child 
may be because parenting goes to the question of personhood, though it seems that 
abortion and the right to bodily integrity would also speak to personhood.  Buss, supra 
note 19, at 823. 
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justification is strengthened if the parents’ right to family integrity cannot be 
fulfilled without curbing the minor’s rights.  This analysis holds true for 
other contexts involving minors’ rights such as commitment to a mental 
institution and enrolling in school.  In contrast, a minor’s rights as a parent 
are not curbed according to the “conditional curtailment test”; even if the 
first prong is fulfilled, curtailment and the resulting obligations on the 
parents do not follow.  This test is helpful in understanding what concurrent 
obligations would have to be imposed to protect young mothers if their 
rights to family integrity were curtailed under the traditional justifications. 
IV.  FOSTER CARE AND THE DEPENDENCY SYSTEM FOR YOUNG MOTHERS 
With a foundational understanding of the rights of young mothers and 
how rights to parental integrity are situated among other adolescent and 
fundamental rights, it is important to understand how the foster care system 
impacts minor parents’ enjoyment of these rights.  In order to fully explore 
the challenges presented to parenting wards, this section will explain the two 
major systems at play:  dependency courts and foster care agencies. 
A child alleged to be abused or neglected goes through court 
proceedings to enter foster care.  Once the child is under the court’s 
supervision, the court holds regular hearings to review the case.95  While the 
child is in foster care, the child welfare agency may provide a place for the 
child to live and provides services to address any needs of the family.96  
Ideally, these two systems work together to support the best interests of the 
foster child and protect her from unnecessary harm.  Though the exact 
nature of the proceedings, the process for removal, and the detailed 
functioning of the child welfare agency vary from state to state, the same 
basic format is used nationally.97 
In this Part, this Comment will outline the standards and general 
processes of dependency courts.  Then, this Comment will explain foster 
care placements and what happens when a ward of the state has a baby. 
A. Dependency Court Proceedings 
Families become involved in the child welfare system after an individual 
or a “mandated reporter” places a report of suspected child abuse or 
 
 95 How the Child Welfare System Works, CHILD WELFARE INFO GATEWAY 7 (May 2012), available 
at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/cpswork.pdf (these hearings are 
typically referred to as “permanency hearings”). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. (laying the framework for nationally required guidelines and notes where procedures 
vary according to state).  
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neglect.98  Child welfare agencies investigate the allegations, but the 
expediency of these investigations depends on the nature of the 
allegations.99  If the agency has genuine concerns about the welfare of the 
child and evidence to support its concerns, the agency can file a dependency 
petition with the court.100  Some children are removed from their homes 
during the investigation due to concerns that the children are being harmed 
or because there is a threat of immediate harm.101  If the child is not 
removed because the risk is not immediate, the court will hold an 
adjudication hearing after proper notice is given to the parents.102 
The state must have a compelling interest to interfere with a parent’s 
right to family autonomy under parens patriae to protect the welfare of 
children.103  Since this is an interference with a fundamental right, there are 
processes in place to protect parents’ rights.104  Even though a fundamental 
right is at stake, parents are not guaranteed representation105 in the two 
types of dependency proceedings—adjudication and termination.106 
At an adjudication hearing, a child can be adjudicated “dependent” 
based on a finding of abuse or neglect.107  This is a full, adversarial 
proceeding that follows the rules of evidence.  Each state has grounds for 
finding a child “dependent,” such as abandonment, physical abuse, and 
failure to provide basic life necessities.108  Most importantly, adjudication 
 
 98 How the Child Welfare System Works, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, at 2–3 (May 2012), 
available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/cpswork.pdf.  A “mandated 
reporter” is someone such as a teacher or doctor who is required by law to report sus-
pected instances of abuse or neglect when they encounter it in their profession. 
 99 Id. at 3–4. 
100 Id. at 4–5. 
101 Id. at 4. 
102 Kathleen G. Noonan et al., Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State:  Lessons from 
Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523, 540 (2009). 
103 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
104 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28–30 (1981). 
105 After Lassiter, parents are not guaranteed representation under federal law, but many 
states have enacted laws to guarantee counsel to parents during these proceedings under 
the belief that protecting family interests is just as important as the protection of bodily 
freedom that guarantees adults the right to counsel in criminal proceedings.  Id. at 32–34. 
106 Noonan et al., supra note 102. 
107 See How the Child Welfare System Works, supra note 95 (stating that if the judge finds at the 
adjudication hearing that maltreatment occurred, the child comes under jurisdiction of 
the court, which makes the child a “dependent” child in most states). 
108 See Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, available at 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/define.pdf (Feb. 2011) 
[hereinafter Definitions] (presenting civil definitions that determine grounds for 
intervention by state child protective agencies); see also Grounds for Involuntary Termination 
of Parental Rights, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, available at 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/ systemwide/ laws_policies/statutes/groundtermin.pdf (Feb. 
2010) [hereinafter Grounds] (discussing process by which state ends parent-child 
relationship). 
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hearings do not use a best interest standard where the judge has discretion 
to decide what would be best for the child.109  There must be some clear 
level of harm or risk of harm to the child at the hands of the parents that 
warrants the state’s interference.110 
If a child is adjudicated dependent, the child welfare agency assumes 
supervision of the child and sets goals for the parents to help remedy the 
problems found in the home.111  The disposition phase of the adjudication 
hearing determines where a dependent child will live.  Adjudicating a child 
dependent does not mean she is automatically removed from the home; in 
fact, many children remain with their parents under state supervision with 
services in place.112  However, many courts remove the dependent children 
to place them in foster homes or with relatives. 113 
Once a child is considered dependent, the parents have less than two 
years to meet the goals set by the child welfare agency to restore their rights 
before a petition to terminate their rights is filed.114  These goals often 
include completion of drug and alcohol treatment, maintaining stable 
housing, and securing gainful employment.115  If the child is under the child 
welfare agency’s supervision for fifteen out of twenty-two months, the agency 
must file to terminate the parent’s rights unless the parent meets one of the 
exceptions set by federal law.116  Parents have a right under Stanley v. Illinois 
to a hearing on parental fitness before their rights can be terminated.117  At a 
termination hearing, the state has to show by clear and convincing evidence 
that the parent is unfit.118  Each state has its own grounds for termination.  
Many grounds include failure to address the root problems that brought the 
child into care and failure to maintain a relationship with the child.119  The 
grounds are often proven by the parent not meeting state-mandated goals.120  
If the state proves the grounds, the parent’s rights to family integrity with 
regard to this particular child or children are permanently terminated. 
 
109 The Adoption and Safe Families Act, 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b) (requiring “reasonable ef-
forts to maintain the family unit and prevent the unnecessary removal of a child from 
his/her home, as long as the child's safety is assured.” The “reasonable efforts” provision 
and other aspects of ASFA emphasize the safety of the child and make safety the standard 
for dependency court proceedings, not best interests.). 
110 See id.  
111 See How the Child Welfare System Works, supra note 95, at 5 (laying the framework for na-
tionally required guidelines and notes where procedures vary according to state). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(c) (2002). 
117 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972). 
118 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982). 
119 See Definitions, supra note 108, and Grounds, supra note 108. 
120 See Grounds, supra note 108.  
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Termination of parental rights is, of course, the ultimate infringement.  
“The Court has repeatedly characterized state interference with parental 
rights in dependency proceedings as compromising a liberty interest so 
important as to guarantee heightened due process.”121  Though adjudication 
is not as severe or permanent as termination, all dependency proceedings 
interfere with a parent’s right to control the custody of her child and young 
mothers’ rights must be protected in these processes. 
B. Foster Care Placement 
If a dependent child is placed into foster care, there are varying types of 
placements she could enter depending on her needs that get progressively 
more restrictive in nature.  Foster homes and kinship care (living with a 
relative or family friend) allow her to live in a traditional family setting.  
Congregate care facilities include group homes, which are residences with 
up to twelve children and a few foster care providers, and residential 
treatment facilities that are more institutionalized and comparable to 
boarding schools.  The highest level of care is for children with severe 
emotional or behavioral problems similar to a mental health hospital.122  
The child welfare agency must try to place the child in the least restrictive 
setting possible, or in the setting that is the most home-like.123  This means 
that a young child with no behavioral or mental health problems should be 
placed in a foster home instead of a residential treatment facility, while a 
child who continues to run away from placement should be placed in a 
residential treatment facility.  As the child’s problems or needs increase, she 
may need a more restrictive placement. 
If a young girl becomes pregnant while in care, it is likely that her foster 
home or group home is not a mother-child placement.  In that case, she 
must be moved to a placement that will allow her and the baby to live 
together.124  During her pregnancy she may be transferred to a maternity 
group home, which is not a mother-baby placement but is only a temporary 
placement that offers prenatal care and support.  This means that where an 
expectant mother is placed in anticipation of her baby’s birth is usually not 
where she will be placed with her baby.125  Also, though agencies usually 
 
121 Katz, supra note 81, at 540. See also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–48 (requiring clear and 
convincing evidence to terminate parental rights). 
122 FORDHAM INTERDISCIPLINARY PARENT REPRESENTATION PROJECT, GUIDE TO WORKING 
WITH YOUNG PARENTS IN OUT OF HOME CARE 9 (2012). 
123 Id. at 6. 
124 CRITTENTON FOUND., supra note 29, at 8. 
125 See YOUTH ADVOCACY CTR., INC., CARING FOR OUR CHILDREN:  IMPROVING THE FOSTER 
CARE SYSTEM FOR TEEN MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 11–15 (1995), available at 
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strive to transfer the expectant mother almost immediately when the 
pregnancy begins, the transfer often happens several months into the 
pregnancy with little time to get settled before the young mother has to 
move again.126 
C. When the Ward Has a Baby 
Since young mothers enjoy the protections of family integrity, their 
babies cannot be removed from their custody and placed into foster care 
simply because the mother is a minor or in foster care herself.  Removing 
the baby based solely on the mother’s age or status as a ward would result in 
infringement of parental rights based on both a stereotype and status, and 
Stanley requires an underlying basis beyond status or stereotype to justify 
infringement.127  The federal government makes retaining the baby in the 
custody of the parenting ward a primary goal and provides incentives not to 
infringe on her rights.128  The babies of teenagers in foster care are not 
automatically under the care of the dependency system129 and are not 
themselves considered wards of the state upon birth.  Federal law mandates 
that “only in situations where the baby is found dependent [through the 
abuse or neglect of the parent] is it appropriate for the teen parent and 
child to be separated.”130 
Federal law and regulations regarding Title IV-E funds, the federal 
funding stream for foster care agencies, provide that when an infant is born 
to a teen in foster care, not only should the child not be removed without 
evidence of child maltreatment, but the young mother and the child should 
reside together.131  Then, payments made by the state to the foster home or 
residential facility must include maintenance for the infant’s support.132  If 
the state removes the baby, the state may not use federal foster funds to 
 
http://www.youthadvocacycenter.org/pdf/CaringforOurChildren.pdf (discussing 
placement options and procedures for teen mothers in foster care). 
126 Id. at 7 (quoting from the experiences of a task force of teen mothers in foster care). 
127 See Katz, supra note 81, at 536 (relaying the story of W.B. and her child’s automatic 
removal upon birth). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654–58 (1972) (asserting 
that there must be an underlying basis beyond status or stereotype to justify infringement 
of parental rights). 
128 See Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 10–13 (discussing federal law and policy 
designed to encourage continued physical custody for mothers in foster care). 
129 Katz, supra note 81, at 550. 
130 Id. at 551. See also Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 12 (explaining that states 
jeopardize their federal subsidies if they separate mothers in foster care from their 
children for reasons other than voluntary placement or finding that remaining in a young 
mother’s care is contrary to infant’s welfare). 
131 See Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 10–11 (analyzing provisions in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 675(4)(B) (2006); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(j) (2011)). 
132 Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 10. 
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support the baby unless the separation is sanctioned by a court order 
through a finding that the baby is dependent.133  Children of teen mothers 
in foster care are also eligible for other assistance that incentivizes keeping 
the mother and baby together, such as Medicaid and Title XX Social 
Services Block Grant funds.134 
In addition, the Child Welfare Act of 1980 conditions funding for foster 
care reimbursements on the federal requirement of “reasonable efforts.”135  
The “reasonable efforts” provision requires that when the state is 
administering child protective services it must either (1) “prevent or 
eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home,” or (2) if 
removed, “make it possible for the child to return home” as soon as 
possible.136  The effort made toward the goal of prevention or reunification 
needs to be “reasonable.”137  This means that if a young mother in foster care 
faces allegations of abuse or neglect, she is entitled to efforts by the child 
welfare agency to keep the baby with her in the home prior to removal or 
reunification services immediately upon removal.138 
Dependency courts provide legal oversight when foster care agencies 
intrude on parents’ rights to protect children from harm.  Adjudication, 
disposition, and termination proceedings include protections for parental 
rights while also maintaining the safety of children.  When a young mother 
is in foster care, her placement situation becomes particularly challenging, 
but the state cannot remove the baby from her care without a finding of 
abuse or neglect.  Not only does the child welfare agency have to respect a 
young parenting ward’s right to family integrity, but there are many 
resources available to support the mother and baby while in placement. 
V.  THE STRUCTURE OF RIGHTS IN THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM 
The structure of parent-child rights becomes even more complicated 
when the adult parent is not actually a parent, but the state.139  According to 
the parens patriae doctrine, once the state becomes the custodian and 
guardian of a minor who lacks proper care and custody from her parents, 
the foster care agency must ensure that decisions are made with the child’s 
 
133 Id. at 12. 
134 See id. at 10–12 for a discussion of federal funding streams and their availability to 
children of minor parents in care. 
135 Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts:  Demystifying the State’s Burden Under Federal 
Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 270 (2003). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 When discussing a minor’s rights in the foster care system, “the state” refers to the 
appropriate county or state foster care agency with jurisdiction over the child. 
Apr. 2013] FOSTERING MOTHERHOOD 1243 
 
best interests in mind.  The foster care agency stands in the place of the 
natural parents and should act as an adult parent would.140 
The legal relationship between the foster care agency and the minor 
parent mirrors the relationship between the natural adult parents and their 
minor parenting child.  The foster care agency has control over the care and 
custody of the minor parent, but not over the baby.  The state may limit the 
parenting ward’s freedom in ways that natural adult parents can, including 
setting curfews and selecting medical providers for the ward, but it is not 
supposed to impose on the minor’s parenting decisions.141 
While there are many parallels between the state’s role as parens patriae 
and the adult parents’, there are two additional obligations placed on foster 
care agencies.  Foster care agencies are required by law to help older youth 
in foster care prepare for life after they leave care,142 and the state has a duty 
to prevent harm to children in its care.143 
A. Preparing the Minor Parent for Life After Foster Care 
Federal law creates an affirmative duty on the state to provide services 
and a plan to help young mothers live on their own after they transition out 
of foster care.144  According to the usual analogy, foster care agencies have 
the same limits and obligations as natural adult parents, but here, an 
additional obligation is placed on the state.145 
Many young parents do not have the information, education, or 
experience necessary to be good parents and depend on the state to provide 
those resources to them.146  The child welfare system often sets up teenage 
mothers for failure by not providing emotional support, information on 
parenting, and adequate preparation for independent living.147  Federal law 
 
140 Bonagura, supra note 1 at 186–87 (describing New York’s approach to minor children in 
its care and its role as parens patriae). 
141 Id. at 188–89. 
142 See 42 U.S.C. § 677 (2006); Palmer v. Cuomo, 503 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21–22 (App. Div. 1986) 
(affirming a successful claim on the part of former foster youth that the state held a duty 
to provide them services and that failure to teach appropriate independent living skills 
resulted in harmful outcomes, such as homelessness). 
143 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195, 199–200 (1989) 
for a discussion of when the state has a duty to protect a child from reasonably 
foreseeable harm. 
144 45 C.F.R § 1357.15 (2002). 
145 Bonagura argues that, outside federal law, even though the baby may not be in the care 
of the state, it is an affirmative duty of the state to protect the parenting ward as a child in 
its care and an implicit duty to protect the baby, so the foster care agency should provide 
the resources necessary for the mother and child to thrive as a unit.  Bonagura, supra note 
1, at 183. 
146 Id. 
147 Katz, supra note 81, at 536–37. 
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requires foster care agencies to provide Independent Living Services and 
Independent Living Plans to children in foster care over sixteen years old to 
help them transition to living on their own once they leave care.148  When 
the child receiving Independent Living Services is also a parent, it would be 
most helpful for her future success if her plan encompassed services that 
would enable her to care for her child independently.149  Those types of 
services could include child care to allow the young mother to pursue an 
education, drug and alcohol treatment, a job search, or vocational 
training.150  In the case of parenting wards, successfully living on their own 
includes independently caring for a child, so they are entitled to services 
that will result in that success. 
B. State’s Duty to Prevent Harm and Protect Child Welfare 
“Because parenting wards are in the care and custody of the state, the 
state has an affirmative duty to protect them . . . .”151  By contrast, when the 
baby lives with the parenting ward and is not a dependent child themselves, 
under DeShaney v. Winnebago County, the foster care agency does not have a 
duty to protect the baby.152  DeShaney holds that a foster care agency only has 
a duty to protect children in its care (children adjudicated dependent) from 
harm that is reasonably foreseeable.153  The babies of parenting wards are 
not automatically in the state’s care as dependent children, so the state can 
deny responsibility for preventing any foreseeable harm to the young 
child.154  Though it goes against natural sensibilities, the agency has no 
obligation to protect the baby and there are no legal ramifications for 
refusal to help the baby. 
The state, “as the caretaker of foster children and the enforcer of child 
welfare laws, . . . has a heightened duty to families of parenting wards before 
and after removal proceedings begin.”155  Child welfare agencies should be 
responsible for situations where harm to the baby was caused by the agency’s 
own failures, which occurs most often when a parenting ward has an 
 
148 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(D) (2006). 
149 Katz, supra note 81, at 551. 
150 Id. 
151 Bonagura, supra note 1, at 194 (emphasis in original). 
152 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195, 199–200 (1989) 
(explaining that state’s duty to protect only arises after it has exerted some control). 
153 The Deshaney Court did not want the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to be construed as holding the state accountable for reasonably foreseeable harm to all 
children.  Id. at 199–200. 
154 Bonagura, supra note 1, at 194. 
155 Id. at 176. 
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inappropriate foster care placement.156  If the source of the maltreatment is 
outside of the mother’s control, there does not seem to be a compelling 
state interest to interfere with her rights.  The welfare of the baby may have 
been compromised, but the source of the harm should be responsible for 
the harm. 
VI.  CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
Young mothers in foster care face infringements that provide two types 
of constitutional claims:  due process and equal protection.  Due process is 
implicated because the right to family integrity is a fundamental right, and 
unjust intrusion into the sphere of parenthood requires due process 
analysis.157  Equal protection issues are raised when parenting wards are 
treated differently than other types of mothers.158 
Though the child welfare agency may not always overtly prohibit a 
parenting practice or require certain actions by the young mother, the 
nature of foster care placements puts undue limitations on a parenting 
ward’s decisions.  A parenting ward may also face unjustified separation 
from her child due to removal of the baby without a finding of abuse or 
neglect, separation of the mother and baby after birth, inappropriate 
placements, the scrutiny of mandated reporters, and the pressure on young 
mothers to “voluntarily” place their children into care. 
The last section of this Part explores the possible equal protection claims 
arising from the heightened scrutiny in foster care placements and 
differential treatment of parenting wards in court proceedings.  A young 
mother in care faces a lower threshold for removal of her children as well as 
standards of care and fitness that are difficult to meet due to her age and 
status as a foster child. 
A. Due Process Implications 
The circumstances of foster care result in rigorous scrutiny of parenting 
wards’ behaviors, and this scrutiny often produces allegations against young 
mothers for child maltreatment.  In the United States, roughly half of all 
 
156 Id. at 194–95.  Bonagura also presents an interesting argument that the state has a duty to 
the baby as a third party based on the law of torts.  Id. at 187 (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965)).  Since, under tort law, “a custodial parent has a duty 
to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm caused to a third party by his or her child,” the 
state has an implied duty to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm by its child, the ward, to 
a third party, the baby.  Id.  Bonagura posits that this includes a duty to provide an 
environment in which a parenting foster child can safely and effectively parent, so as not 
to cause harm to the baby, the third party.  Bonagura, supra note 1, at 187. 
157 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 792, 794–97. 
158 Id. at 668. 
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teen mothers are investigated for child maltreatment.159  When young 
mothers are parenting wards who live with mandatory reporters and 
confront biases within the system, the numbers are likely higher. 
When the state unjustly interferes with a young mother’s right to control 
the care or custody of her baby, she faces due process violations.  This Part 
will examine unjust interferences with both parenting wards’ care of their 
children and the custody of their children. 
1. Interference With Parenting Practices 
Foster care agencies have a duty not only to protect the parenting wards 
but “not to impinge on their parental rights.”160  Despite the theoretical 
protection of family integrity, parenting wards have little flexibility in how to 
raise their children due to strict rules in the foster care system, such as 
curfews, leave restrictions, limitations on visitors, and mandatory feeding 
schedules.161  In practice, the state often utilizes its parental role to dictate 
matters inherently part of the young mother’s fundamental right to parent 
her child, such as whether she can breast-feed or when she can take the baby 
to the doctor.162 
For example, Joelle163 had her baby with her while she was in care.  One 
night her baby got very sick, and Joelle wanted to take the baby to the 
hospital.  However, the supervisors in her group home said she would have 
to wait until the next morning because it was past curfew.  The situation 
required a judgment call that Joelle, as the baby’s mother, was entitled to 
make; she never should have been prohibited from taking actions she 
believed to be in her child’s best interests.  In the end, Joelle made the 
decision to take her child to the hospital, and as a result, she was kicked out 
of her group home.  These types of rules and restrictions limit a minor’s 
ability to parent and are infringements on family integrity.  Parenting 
decisions, regardless of the mother’s status as a ward of the state, are 
protected by her right to family integrity unless she is found to be unfit. 
 
159 CRITTENTON FOUND., supra note 29, at 6. 
160 Bonagura, supra note 1, at 194. 
161 See YOUTH ADVOCACY CTR., supra note 125, for several different accounts from parenting 
wards that detail specific rules on bottle feeding and limitations on how often babies 
could see their fathers, in addition to other rules that infringe on the mothers’ parenting. 
162 Id. at 8, 31–33. 
163 “Joelle” is a pseudonym.  This story came from a conversation with a former foster youth 
in Philadelphia. 
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2. Inappropriate Separation 
When a young mother is separated from her child for any reason except 
to protect the baby’s safety, it is an interference with her right to control the 
custody of her child.  Parenting wards face several types of inappropriate 
separations:  when the baby is placed into foster care simply because the 
mother is a minor, when the mother is awaiting an appropriate placement 
for both her and the baby after birth, when the mother is coerced to 
“voluntarily” place the baby into care, when circumstances of the placement 
are held against the mother, and when mandated reporters overly scrutinize 
her behavior. 
a. Unjustified Removal of the Baby 
Over and over again, young girls report that they were unlawfully 
separated from their children at birth without any allegations of abuse or 
neglect.164  Despite provisions and the explicit position of the federal 
government that the mother and baby should be placed together after birth, 
many agencies immediately place the babies into foster care after they are 
born, disregarding the fundamental interest of young mothers to retain 
custody of their children and sidestepping all of the protections in place.165  
In fact, many states are not even aware that Title IV-E funds can be leveraged 
to aid the babies of young mothers in their care.166  For many agencies, the 
motivation behind placing the babies into foster care is to receive separate 
funding for the baby.  Ironically, these actions are actually grounds for the 
agency to stop receiving federal reimbursements for the baby. 
 
164 YOUTH ADVOCACY CTR., supra note 125, at 8. 
165 See R.F. v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 740 So.2d. 1093, 1095 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) 
(“[T]his case does not involve neglect or child abuse by the mother. In fact, the record 
indicates that the mother has expressed only love and concern for her child and that the 
child was placed in [state] custody solely because the mother herself had been placed in 
foster care . . . .”); In re Tayquon H., 821 A.2d 796, 799 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (stating 
that when an eleven-year-old girl in foster care gave birth, only her age was listed as the 
reason she could not care for her child); In re Inez, 704 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Mass. 1999) 
(explaining that the state took custody of a child immediately following birth based on a 
teen mother’s history of running away from her foster placements); In re Brown, No. 
293045, 2010 WL 481025, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2010) (explaining that the state 
filed a removal petition because the teen mother was in foster care with too little income 
to obtain her child’s medication); In re Interest of Hall, 703 A.2d 717, 718 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1997) (“The apparent reason for the action on the part of [the state] to adjudicate the 
child dependent was that K.A.H. was born to a minor child who herself was adjudicated 
dependent.”). 
166 See generally Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 5–6 & n.11, for a survey of four states 
that illustrates the low level of attention afforded to the parenting ward population, 
regardless of the possible funding implications. 
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Agencies have concerns about the possible harm young mothers may 
cause when the baby resides with the young mother in placement, but the 
agency does not have any supervisory authority.  Placing the baby under the 
supervision of the foster care agency allows the provider to intervene on 
behalf of the baby when necessary.  However, under DeShaney, foster care 
agencies are not legally responsible to children not under their supervision, 
so any liability concerns are unfounded.167 
b.  Separation After Birth 
Part of the problem may be that the law only requires joint placement 
after birth but makes no recommendations on where the pregnant teen 
should be placed before birth.  Pregnant wards spend much of their 
pregnancy in a temporary placement waiting to find out where they will be 
placed after the baby arrives and then experience separation from the baby 
after the birth while the agency searches for an appropriate placement for 
them both.168  Since there is a shortage of mother-child placements, 
including both foster families and group homes,169 finding an appropriate 
placement can take several weeks.  During the wait, the baby remains in the 
hospital, separated from her mother, and at considerable cost to the foster 
care agency, and the mother and baby may have to go to the first-available 
placement instead of a placement that suits them best.170 
c.  Pressure to Voluntarily Place the Baby 
One of the most concerning issues young mothers in care encounter is 
“voluntary” separation as a result of coercive measures used to pressure 
parenting wards to give up their children.171  Foster parents, social workers, 
or staff in group homes may exert pressure on parenting wards to place their 
babies in care or may even use threats of maltreatment allegations to get 
mothers to comply.172  In Illinois, social workers were using threats of false 
reports of abuse and neglect to pressure the parenting ward to cooperate 
with placement or to punish them for complaining about the quality of 
 
167 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989). 
168 Bonagura, supra note 1, at 202; Katz, supra note 81, at 550. 
169 Bonagura, supra note 1, at 202. 
170 YOUTH ADVOCACY CTR., supra note 125, at 23–26. 
171 See Bonagura, supra note 1, at 181–82, for discussion of a situation in New York where 
mothers may have to give up their children due to a lack of available services and 
funding.  The relinquishment is considered “voluntary,” but it is not actually a result of 
the mother’s free will and volition. 
172 Id. at 182. 
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placement services.173  The problem in Illinois was demonstrated by the 
numbers; over a five year period, the number of parenting teens in care de-
creased as the number of children removed increased.174  Illinois remedied 
the problem of social workers using coercive measures through remedial 
legislation.175  In Florida, the problem of coercion was manifested as a 
pattern of removing children of teen wards just as the young mother was 
about to age out of foster care.176  Accusations of abuse and neglect were 
often initiated by foster parents who wanted to retain care of the baby.177 
Social workers and foster parents, acting vicariously as the state, who 
coerce mothers to place their children into foster care are inappropriately 
meddling with their rights to the companionship and care of their child.  If 
the young mother decided to sign her baby into care “voluntarily,” she likely 
did not come to that decision on her own and would not have done so 
without the internal and external pressures of her placement. 
d. Placement-Created Problems 
Even when the mother and child are finally placed together, there may 
not be appropriate provisions in the home for a parenting ward and her 
baby, like an age-appropriate bed, and money is usually not provided for the 
young mother to secure the necessary food and clothing for her baby.178  
These types of inappropriate living conditions and lack of resources for the 
parenting ward and her child would be considered abuse or neglect if they 
happened in the home of the natural adult parents.179  When they occur in 
the foster home, the agency does not accept liability; instead, these 
circumstances are cited against the young mothers as neglect.180  It is highly 
problematic for the foster care system to create inappropriate home 
environments, compromising the welfare of the baby, and then to hold the 
young mother accountable. 
 
173 See Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 19, at 21–23 (noting that threats by foster care staff may 
be more widespread than previously imagined). 
174 Id. at 24. 
175 Id. at 22–23. 
176 Id. at 25 (evaluating operating procedures of the Florida Department of Children and 
Families). 
177 Id. 
178 Since few states appropriately utilize Title IV-E funds to provide financial support for the 
baby, it is the young mother’s responsibility to buy food, diapers, and clothing.  See 
Bonagura, supra note 1, at 183–86 (telling the story of Ariella, who is highlighted in the 
introduction of this Comment). 
179 Id. at 188. 
180 Id. 
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Parenting wards may also be responsible for the lack of resources 
provided by the foster care agency,181 or other situations that are beyond the 
minor’s control.  Parenting wards should only be held responsible for abuse 
and neglect of their children that directly results from their actions or 
situations within their control; to hold them responsible otherwise is a 
violation of their right to family integrity and an unwarranted intrusion of 
the state. 
e.  Mandated Reporters in the Home 
Another obstacle unique to parenting wards is that they often live in 
group homes or facilities with mandated reporters.182  Mandated reporters 
are required by law to report actions of the young mother or circumstances 
that may threaten the welfare of the baby.  The culture of the placements 
can also be highly problematic for parenting wards and threaten their right 
to family integrity.  Young mothers in foster care often live with staff 
members, caseworkers, and foster parents who are willing to get authorities 
involved, so they are more likely to be over-scrutinized and less likely to have 
a chance to learn from their mistakes.183 
Parenting wards are often reported for actions that could be considered 
“normal” teenage behavior where their child is not harmed or facing threat 
of harm.184  Although missing curfew or AWOLing185 may be rebellious 
behaviors that break the rules and require punishment, these behaviors do 
not rise to the level of abuse, neglect, or even threat of harm.186  Though 
leaving the baby for a period of time under any circumstances may be 
considered a threat of harm to the baby, taking the baby to a doctor of the 
mother’s choosing or attending an appointment when she is not allowed to 
be off campus can result in initiation of proceedings against the young 
mother even though she is not leaving the child unattended.187  If a 
parenting ward engages in typical teenage behaviors or breaks the rules of 
her placement while ensuring her child is safe, the state has no grounds to 
infringe on her rights to the care and custody of her baby. 
 
181 Id. 
182 Horwitz, supra note 16, at 426. 
183 Id. at 426–27. 
184 See the full discussions and stories throughout Horwitz, supra note 16.  These types of 
stories are common anecdotes told by former foster youth and child advocate attorneys. 
185 “AWOL” is a military term meaning “absent without leave,” but it is used in foster care 
when a child runs away from or leaves placement without authorization.  See MARNI 
FINKELSTEIN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, YOUTH WHO CHRONICALLY AWOL FROM 
FOSTER CARE:  WHY THEY RUN, WHERE THEY GO, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE 1 (2004). 
186 Horwitz, supra note 16, at 421. 
187 Id. 
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There are two types of due process problems parenting wards encounter:  
limitations on their ability to care for their children and improper 
interference with maintaining the custody of their children.  The varying 
layers of infringements demonstrate the young mothers’ struggle to 
maintain family autonomy while living in foster care. 
B. Equal Protection Claims 
Disparate treatment between young mothers who are in care and all 
other mothers, both adults and teens not in foster care, raises possible equal 
protection claims.  Young mothers in foster care are impacted differently 
when it comes to both the care and custody of their children.  Under an 
equal protection analysis, two similarly situated groups cannot be treated 
differently without appropriate justification by the state, especially when a 
fundamental interest is at stake.188  There is no appropriate justification for 
treating teen mothers in foster care differently than other mothers.  This 
Part will explore both the differential treatment of young mothers that arises 
from the foster care placement and differential treatment in dependency 
court proceedings. 
1. In Foster Care Placement 
If the level of scrutiny a young mother in the foster care system faces is 
not the same as it is for all other parents, she has an equal protection claim 
when the different treatment is not justified.  Other mothers, regardless of 
age, do not face coercion to “voluntarily” place their children into care.  
Other mothers are not held responsible for inappropriate placements or 
failures of case workers—circumstances outside of their control that result in 
violations of their right to family integrity.  Parenting wards live with 
mandated reporters, and they would not face the same level of scrutiny of 
their everyday lives if they were not in a foster placement, so young mothers 
end up penalized for being in foster care.  The state should simulate the role 
of natural parents and apply the same level of scrutiny to parenting wards as 
to other parents so as not to disadvantage teen parents placed in its care. 
Parenting wards are also penalized for being teenagers when typical 
teenage behaviors are held against them.189  In such situations, it seems clear 
 
188 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 668, 675. 
189 This unwarranted punishment may be a more widespread problem that falls outside the 
scope of this Comment.  For instance, older foster youth may be heavily penalized for 
smoking marijuana or skipping school—behaviors, which while not acceptable, are 
typical amongst teenagers.  However, the ramifications for foster youth engaging in these 
behaviors are more severe than for teenagers outside the dependency system.  Foster 
youth may face the removal of services, a new placement, or an increase in the restrictive 
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that if the parenting ward were a parent in any other context, her actions 
would not be held against her in a maltreatment investigation.  If an adult 
parent or a non-ward teenage mother arranged for a babysitter and went out 
for the evening, it would be considered completely appropriate behavior.  If 
a non-ward parent engaged in typical teenage rule-breaking and broke 
curfew while ensuring her child was safe, the state would have no grounds to 
infringe on her rights. 
It is not acceptable for a young mother to be held responsible for the 
failings of the foster care system when other mothers are not subject to the 
same liabilities.  It is also not acceptable for the same actions to have 
different ramifications for parenting wards than they do for other mothers.  
The threshold for removal of a parenting ward’s baby should not be lowered 
because she is in foster care. 
2. In Dependency Proceedings 
Young mothers start their journey as parents at a disadvantage because 
achieving the standard of fitness requires more work and perseverance than 
is required of adult parents.  The minor is held to the same standards as 
adult parents but not given the same freedoms and ability to parent.  This is 
true with regard to the limited access minors have to necessary resources like 
housing, employment, and welfare benefits discussed earlier, but it is 
especially true in the foster care setting when placement rules often severely 
limit the ability of parenting wards to make decisions regarding the 
upbringing of their children.  These disadvantages make it more likely that 
the young mothers’ rights to family integrity will be infringed upon or 
severed; parenting wards do not have the same chances of success as adult 
parents or young parents in natural homes. 
When a minor parent faces allegations that she abused or neglected her 
own child, there are some judges who are quick to validate the allegations 
due to the parent’s status as a ward of the state.190  This ultimately holds 
parenting wards to a different threshold for validating allegations of 
maltreatment than all other parents because the decision is not based on a 
showing of abuse or neglect.  A minor’s status as a ward alone is not 
evidence that she committed maltreatment.  If the proceedings progress to a 
 
level of care.  Youth outside the system may only face a citation.  Due to the nature of 
foster care and the struggle of agencies to provide education, vocational training, and 
assistance in housing applications, foster youth may be held to higher expectations—with 
higher stakes—than youth outside of care. 
190 See Bonagura, supra note 1, at 177–78 (describing a problem in New York Family Courts 
that agencies responsible for parenting wards “take a policing approach . . . that is 
adversarial and punitive, rather than supportive, educational, and preventative” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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termination hearing, severing the right to family autonomy is based on 
unfitness.  The court should apply the same standards of safety and fitness to 
parenting wards as to other parents so as not to disadvantage young mothers 
in foster care.  Children should absolutely be protected from abuse and 
neglect at the hands of their parents, and courts should not institute a lower 
threshold for the baby’s welfare due to the mother’s age, but the threshold 
for government intrusion into the family unit should be adjusted so one 
group of parents is not at a greater risk of governmental intrusion than 
another. 
The equal protection problems arising from foster care placements and 
in dependency court proceedings go hand-in-hand with the due process 
considerations.  While in placement, young mothers are treated differently 
than all other mothers.  This differential treatment results in unjust 
interference with their ability to parent and oftentimes with their ability to 
retain custody of their children.  Once the baby is removed, parenting wards 
face different standards in court proceedings that place them at a greater 
likelihood for the ultimate infringement of their parental rights:  
termination. 
VII.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Two things are clear:  (1) young mothers have full rights to parent their 
children as they see fit, and (2) the ability to fully exercise that right is 
inhibited by their age and often by their status as a ward of the state.  Instead 
of curtailing the rights of minor parents to family integrity under the 
traditional framework of adolescent rights, the Court has nominally given 
young mothers full parental rights.  In practice, though, young mothers are 
not fully able to realize their parental rights.  Family integrity is dangled like 
a carrot on a stick in front of minor parents, a goal they may never fully be 
able to achieve.  Allowing adolescents to be adults in the context of 
parenting is uncomfortable to many individuals, causing the state to respond 
with paternalism and penalization.  In the current structure of adolescent 
rights, granting full rights of parenthood to “kids” may seem 
counterintuitive, especially since there are limits both on the minor’s 
parenting resources and the adult parent’s ability to intervene. 
To solve some of these problems, the state could infringe on minors’ 
rights to family integrity under the “conditional curtailment” test.  If minors 
fulfill the first prong of the test and are sufficiently mature, young mothers 
could be granted full adult rights that allow access to necessary resources.  
The process would be like granting majority status to young mothers on a 
conditional basis after they demonstrate maturity.  If the minor parent does 
not fulfill the maturity prong, the state could curtail her right to family 
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integrity and obligate the natural adult parents or the state to provide 
additional support to the young mother. 
To address the problems with removal and assessing parental fitness in 
court proceedings, states should model the legislation put in place by 
California or adopt New York’s family court standards. 
A. Curtailing Rights Under the “Conditional Curtailment” Test 
There is proper justification for the infringing on a young mother’s right 
to family integrity by analyzing minor parents’ rights through the existing 
framework of adolescent rights.  Minors’ rights would receive greater 
protection from the adolescent rights framework under the “conditional 
curtailment” test than by providing provisional rights to family integrity 
without means to protect young mothers from unjust infringement. 
Whether the young mother is mature enough to make life-altering 
decisions varies by age and individual.  Deciding whether or not an 
expectant mother is mature enough to make the life-altering decision to 
have a child would require individualized assessment.  The two-part analysis 
of the “conditional curtailment” test would allow a mature mother to 
preserve her right to family integrity without interference from her parents 
or the state, but neither her parents nor the state would be obligated to 
provide additional guidance or support.  This process of deciding which 
mothers meet the maturity prong could mirror or build upon the case-by-
case analysis that happens through the judicial bypass procedures with 
abortion.191 
If an expectant mother is not mature enough to make life-altering 
decisions like the decision to have a child, fulfilling the first prong of the 
analysis, the adult parents or the state would be obligated to guide the 
decision-making processes of their pregnant child.  This would not allow a 
parent to force her child to have an abortion or give the baby up for 
adoption,192 but would give the adult parents a voice in weighty decisions 
and allow the natural parents to help guide their child’s parenting practices.  
The curtailment affords the adult parents full protection of their rights to 
family autonomy and places on them an obligation—as in other contexts 
where there is a gap between the rights afforded to minors and the rights 
afforded upon majority—to act in their daughter’s best interest and provide 
 
191 But see Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 561 
(2000) (arguing against an intermediate classification and approach that confers adult 
legal rights or responsibilities based on individualized assessments of maturity because it 
is too costly and burdensome). 
192 The state has an interest in the young mother carrying her child to term, and the 
decision to have a family is also protected under the right to family integrity, though it 
falls outside the scope of this Comment. 
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the resources and support necessary for her to parent her child.  This 
obligation could include being the payee for welfare benefits for both their 
daughter and the baby, providing appropriate housing, ensuring the young 
mother has proper medical care, and helping the teenager navigate her new 
role as a parent.  Allowing the curtailment of rights based on the immaturity 
of the teen mother would especially benefit very young mothers who have 
the least access to resources and need the most help.  Young mothers ages 
eleven, twelve, or thirteen cannot drive let alone secure the monetary 
resources required to be the primary provider for their children. 
If a minor qualifies as mature and thus infringement is not justified, the 
mature minor could be given the full rights of majority upon becoming a 
parent.  This goes beyond emancipating minors and includes actually 
allowing them to enter into contracts, make medical decisions, receive 
public assistance checks, and in all other ways engage in the legal aspects of 
life as if they were adults.  If there is not a concern about a minor’s ability to 
make rational, mature, and informed decisions, granting her these rights 
should not pose serious problems.  If young parents are afforded rights, and 
there is no justification for infringing upon them, they should be given the 
vehicles to access and realize their rights.  The most reasonable and effective 
way to do that is to expand their rights in other arenas. 
The two-part analysis would justify the restrictions placed on minors’ 
parenting by foster care placements if the young parent meets the 
immaturity requirement.  These restrictions bring affirmative obligations on 
the agency to provide any resources the young mother needs to effectively 
parent.  Just as with the natural adult parents when the adolescent rights are 
curtailed, the obligation to fill any gaps, guide the decision-making process, 
and provide resources to the young mother carries over to the state.  
Assistance would include things like parenting classes, financial support to 
help provide for the baby, and appropriate housing accommodations. 
There is a benefit of curtailment that might be appealing to parenting 
wards who are mature enough to make long-term decisions and for whom 
infringement is not justified.  There could be an option for a mature parent 
to opt out of her full rights in order to receive the benefits of state resources.  
With the “conditional curtailment” test, the foster care agency would need a 
finding of the parenting ward’s immaturity to justify intrusion into the 
minor’s parenting practices, but the minor could waive her full right to 
family integrity to reap the benefits of additional support and resources.  
While actively infringing on a fundamental right is greatly prohibited, an 
individual could elect to have her rights infringed upon to reap a benefit.  
Infringement and the obligation to provide additional assistance go hand-in-
hand—the agency cannot infringe on the parenting ward’s rights without 
providing additional assistance to be effective parents, but the additional 
assistance is not required without infringement.  While there may be some 
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concern about foster care workers coercing young mothers to curtail their 
rights, the curtailment comes with an added burden on the state that should 
curb undue influence.  This may also mean that child welfare agencies may 
begin engaging in a balancing test to determine if limiting a parenting 
ward’s ability to control the upbringing of her children is worth the price of 
additional assistance the agency will be obligated to provide. 
B. Legislation and Court Standards to Remedy Infringements on Minors’ 
Right to Family Integrity 
Beyond offering services pursuant to the “conditional curtailment” test, 
there are legislative measures that states can take to protect the rights of 
parenting wards.  California has legislation to protect parenting wards from 
some of the problems they face in foster care, and New York’s court rules 
provide protections for parents who are minors.  In addition, child welfare 
agencies could more effectively carry out the federal mandate for 
Independent Living Services. 
The state of California recently passed legislation specifically addressing 
the problems young mothers face in the foster system:  the increased 
likelihood of removal, reduced access to traditional support systems 
available to other minor and first-time parents, unrealistic expectations of 
parenting wards inconsistent with their age and development, and shortages 
in placements resulting in separation and thus disrupting the parent-child 
bond.193  At the very least, all states should accept measures like these to cure 
the problems and inequalities that parenting wards face. 
Proceedings should be adjusted so the law impacts all mothers equally.  
This would require the court to take into account the complications of a 
parenting ward’s placement, removal of biases in court proceedings, and 
standards of parental fitness that young mothers can achieve given the 
resources available to them.  In New York, the parent’s age must be taken 
into account in determining whether there has actually been neglect.194  The 
rationale is that a minor cannot be expected to provide the standard of care 
for their child as well as an adult parent; the minor “cannot be penalized for 
not acting like an adult.”195  This may make it seem that minors have a lower 
threshold of care and fitness to meet than adult parents, but in reality, it 
adjusts the standard to meet the level of care a minor can reasonably be 
expected to provide. 
 
193 Teen Parents in Foster Care Act § 2, S.B. 1178, 2004 Cal. Stat. c. 841.  
194 Bonagura, supra note 1, at 214. 
195 Id. (citing In re Lawrence Children, 768 N.Y.S.2d 83, 92 (Fam. Ct. 2003)). 
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In In re Barnett, a minor parent’s rights were terminated, in part because 
she could not obtain employment.196  While the court normally took lack of 
employment into consideration when terminating an adult parent’s rights, 
the court overturned the termination after considering the minor’s age.197  
More courts should factor these kinds of considerations into their decisions.  
A minor should not be considered “unfit” for not providing housing when 
they cannot sign a lease or for not purchasing appropriate clothes when they 
cannot get benefits and are not eligible for employment.  Adults, however, 
have access to those resources and therefore can be held accountable for 
not providing them.  Adjusting the standard of care does not adjust the 
showing of “clear and convincing evidence” that must be demonstrated for a 
finding of parental unfitness; it merely changes the type of evidence that 
demonstrates parental unfitness. 
CONCLUSION 
The interests of the young child are protected when the minor’s rights 
are protected; babies would benefit from the certainty and consistency of 
remaining in their mother’s care.198  “[R]emoval without a true attempt to 
rehabilitate the minor parent or address any of the issues causing concern 
perpetuates a cycle of removal and does harm to all of the parties 
involved.”199  If the minor’s parenting practices are the “issues causing 
concern” that lead to removal, “rehabilitating” the issues requires 
restructuring minors’ rights to family integrity to either (1) obligate the 
adult parent or state to provide additional assistance to the young parent, or 
(2) increase her access to adult rights.  If the issues that lead to removal are 
outside of the young mother’s control and are instead violations of her 
constitutional rights, immediate remedies to eliminate or alleviate the 
problems would serve both the minor mother and the baby.  The positive 
policy implications of these measures are resounding:  not only would 
rethinking the structure of minor parents’ rights and preventing 
constitutional violations help stop the cycle of foster care, but the babies 
would greatly benefit from these changes. 
 
 
 
 
196 In re Barnett, 450 A.2d 1356, 1362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). 
197 Id. 
198 Buss, supra note 19, at 829. 
199 Bonagura, supra note 1, at 202–03. 
